In the near future, a company may receive a software update, verify its legitimacy, and, as it has done numerous times before, install it across the enterprise. But what follows may be unprecedented: The update will contain a malicious payload concealed behind an apparently legitimate digital signature, causing failures to cascade across operations as the integrity of every system, record and communication is suddenly called into question.
Attacks like these may soon be enabled by quantum computing, which bad actors could use to crack the cryptographic mechanisms that have traditionally guaranteed trust. Q-Day — the moment when quantum becomes powerful enough to break standard encryption — could arrive within years.
The first post-quantum challenge is protecting what must remain confidential. This essential work has centered on addressing the urgency of “harvest now, decrypt later” attacks, which involve adversaries siphoning off and storing encrypted data they hope to one day break.
But confidentiality is only one dimension of risk. The next challenge may be even more consequential: protecting authenticity.
Called “trust now, forge later,” this emerging threat has broad implications for large enterprises that depend on complex supply chains of hundreds of technology vendors and whose IT environments increasingly include AI systems. As AI agents act and transact autonomously on behalf of people and organizations, the ability to verify digital identity and authenticity will become even more critical. “Trust now, forge later” is therefore becoming more than a cryptography issue; it is a Board-level resilience risk that demands action today.
How quantum could undermine trust
Companies rely on cryptographic mechanisms to establish trust. Software patches, for instance, come with a digital signature that can be verified through corresponding public and private cryptographic keys, proving they’re from the expected vendor and that code has not been altered. Bad actors can’t convincingly copy these signatures when they do not possess the vendor’s private signing key.
Historically, this method has given businesses confidence in system updates and the integrity of their data. But attackers could eventually use quantum computing to derive private keys and forge signatures that appear legitimate, allowing them to carry out nefarious activity under the guise of authenticity.
This has far-reaching ramifications for operational resilience. It will be harder to trust the digital certificates, software updates and device authentication that businesses depend on. Trust could be further undermined across machine and workload identities, firmware and APIs.
Risk also extends across the supply chain, where attack vectors will be myriad. One compromise of critical signing keys or trusted certificate infrastructure could enable malicious software or other digital artifacts to appear authentic, creating the potential for widespread malware distribution and major disruption.
Heightened risk in mission-critical environments
Quantum-enabled attacks could have a particularly pronounced impact in industries such as manufacturing, energy and transportation, where a breach of trust could disrupt physical operations and threaten worker safety. Industrial control systems and other operational technology (OT) may remain in service for years, operate continuously, and be difficult to update, leaving organizations reliant on cryptographic protections that must be both durable and adaptable as standards evolve.
The path to post-quantum readiness
While quantum computing is still on the horizon, the recent report from the G7 Cybersecurity Working Group urges public- and private-sector organizations to begin transitioning now. Preparation will take years, and analysts project that practical quantum computing could come into force as soon as 2030.
Organizations should map and continuously monitor their cryptographic estate, including supply chains, and prioritize action to protect their critical business services. Foundational work includes inventorying cryptographic assets, mapping dependencies and developing migration plans.
In addition to defining their minimum viable company, organizations will need to define their minimum viable vendor ecosystem. Enterprises must verify that their suppliers and partners, and their own chains of digital dependencies, are trustworthy.
Cryptographic asset management can help organizations discover, track, automate and secure certificates, keys and other cryptographic assets at the accelerated pace that the post-quantum era will demand. Continuous validation, automated lifecycle management, and the ability to rapidly update algorithms, keys and certificates will be critical to maintaining trust as threats and standards evolve.
Organizations should plan for how they would validate systems, software, identities and data if cryptographic trust was compromised. Recovery strategies should establish independent trust anchors, known-good configurations and validation mechanisms that allow identities and critical services to be restored with confidence.
Early signs of adaptation
As government and industry bodies around the world prepare for post-quantum cryptography, changes already underway point toward the operating model organizations will need: greater automation, shorter trust cycles and increased cryptographic agility.
Major technology vendors and certificate authorities are dramatically shortening the lifetime of TLS (Transport Layer Security) certificates. By 2029, as part of a phased reduction, the maximum certificate validity will be just 47 days, down from nearly 400 days. The shorter its validity period, the less time a potentially stolen, compromised or outdated credential can be misused before it must be replaced.
Decisions like these reflect a growing recognition that traditional approaches must evolve. In the lead-up to Q-Day, as our research highlights, organizations will need to progressively make applications, infrastructure, networks and data systems capable of adopting post-quantum security. There’s work to be done: for example, only 4% of companies have fully implemented quantum-resistant network security mechanisms.
The G7 report frames the transition as a collective challenge — one that will require coordination between enterprises, technology providers, suppliers and governments. This last point is important. No organization can ensure digital integrity on its own. With the right support, leaders can act today to prepare for Q-Day by protecting digital trust.
Executing across highly complex technology systems requires deliberate decisions and strategic organization-wide transformation. Importantly, you cannot fast-track trust once it has been broken. Because this modernization journey will take years, the runway for hesitation has officially ended. The race to preserve post-quantum trust has already begun – and the time to act is now.